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1 Abstract
This thesis investigates the impact of economic integration, or openness, on welfare state
generosity. I provide an overview of the development of Western welfare states and
describe two competing hypotheses on how national governments react to openness in
terms of welfare provision. The compensation hypothesis states that increased openness
means higher risk for citizens and thus a demand for higher welfare state generosity, the
focus of the efficiency hypothesis is that both welfare migration and the assumption that
countries will have to alter of tax rates in order to attract mobile tax bases both will put
downward pressure on welfare generosity.
The contribution of this thesis is empirical. To motivate the empirical exercise, I
present a simple theory for how increased economic integration affects welfare states
through tax competition. I also discuss different ways of defining welfare state generosity
and how to choose the measure that captures the essential characteristics of the welfare
system, while at the same time being easy to compare among countries in empirical
research.
Earlier studies have found conflicting evidence on the subject. There might be several
reasons for this: particularly, the results may depend on the choice of welfare measure,
the explanatory variable or choice of econometric method.
Here, using Stata 9.0, the effect of economic integration is estimated utilizing inter-
national trade as proxy for openness on several welfare variables for an unbalanced panel
of 18 OECD-countries over the years 1970-2000. I conduct the analysis by using fixed
effects regression and find evidence in favor of the efficiency hypothesis. This result is
robust to several sensitivity analyses.
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2 Introduction
The Welfare State systems in Western countries have been subject to both praise and
criticism since they started to evolve rapidly after World War II. Development of social
security nets and a substantial growth in the public sector is not an obvious political
consensus, but apart from mere value judgments about the state’s role in providing social
security, other aspects of the conditions for welfare states have been much debated over
the past years as well. What really determines welfare state generosity has been much
analyzed - in terms of political, economic and demographical factors as well as established
institutions.
In this thesis, I focus on one aspect that has been discussed at great length, namely
economic integration, or openness1. For all OECD-countries, both international trade and
foreign direct investment have increased over the last decades. There is a contrast between
governments shaping institutions for international trade, investment and integration of
financial markets on one hand and coping with the consequences of economic integration
on the other. The growth in openness has thus given grounds for a substantial discussion
regarding the relationship between economic integration and domestic politics. A higher
degree of integration of national economies creates possibilities for spillover-effects when
countries decide on policies unilaterally. Whereas traditionally, tax schemes and how
to finance public spending have been mainly domestic issues; now, by increased trade
and flows of capital between countries, decisions one country makes will have larger
implications for other economies. In addition, more integrated markets imply higher
exposure to external shocks for the citizens.
What are the effects of more market integration markets and higher mobility of tax
bases? There are two main frameworks used for trying to answer this question:
The efficiency hypothesis claims that economic integration undermines governments’
sovereignty in domestic matters and leads them to alter tax rates and cut back on social
transfers. The compensation hypothesis, on the other hand, focuses on the increased
demand for social security following deeper integration of markets, as this exposes the
citizens to external shocks. Hence welfare state generosity, according to this hypothesis,
should be increased to compensate for this risk.
Previous studies find conflicting evidence on the effect of openness on welfare state
generosity - both positive effect, negative effect and no effect have been advocated.
One much cited example is Rodrik (1998), who finds that international trade in-
creases government spending and social spending. This result is reached by Ordinary
1I will use the two terms interchangeably.
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Least Squares analysis on a 3-year average of observations of a large sample of countries.
Other analyses use other conceptualizations of welfare state generosity, other proxies for
openness and other empirical methods - thus there are several potential reasons for the
differences in outcomes.
The problem of measuring welfare state generosity is the basis for the second aspect
of this thesis, which is a more methodological issue. How should welfare states be con-
ceptualized? By the volume of social spending in a country? By a particular benefit, e.g.
pensions? What are we really comparing when we contrast one welfare state system with
another?
This thesis is aiming at joining the debates on the effect of openness on welfare states
and on how to conceptualize welfare state generosity. I do this by evaluating the effect of
economic integration on several dependent variables that have been used as measures for
welfare state generosity in previous research, and compare the outcomes for the different
variables. I will seek to get a clearer answer to the question of the effects of openness by
using a wider spectrum of welfare variables. An empirical analysis of 18 OECD-countries
from 1970-2000 is provided, estimating the effect of openness on different welfare measures
by fixed effect analysis.
I use welfare measures belonging to three different perspectives on how welfare state
generosity should be conceptualized: the volume perspective, which measures social
spending, the inequality perspective, which measures the distribution of disposable in-
come, and finally the institutional perspective, which measures social entitlements.
Using international trade as explanatory variable, I find that openness decreases wel-
fare state generosity. This results remain robust through several sensitivity analyses:
testing for business cycle effects, conducting the analyses with other proxies for openness,
omitting possible endogenous control variables from the analysis and lagging explanatory
variables to avoid reverse causality does not alter my main conclusion.
The thesis is organized as follows: Section 3 provides an overview of the development
of Western welfare states, both in a historical perspective and for recent years, and also
discusses how to define a welfare state system. Section 4 describes the two hypotheses for
effects of economic integration on welfare state generosity (efficiency and compensation)
in further detail and provides a theoretical background for the effect of openness on public
spending through tax competition. Section 5 summarizes literature on both openness and
tax competition and on openness and welfare state generosity. Section 6 describes the
econometric method I choose for the analysis and discusses choices of different dependent
variables in welfare state research. Section 7 describes the data used. In section 8, the
results from the analysis are presented, and section 9 concludes.
3
3 Welfare states - an overview
3.1 A very short history
A welfare state is a relatively new phenomenon in the history of social protection.
From the 16th century on, "poor laws" under an absolutist state constituted the social
security net in European countries. With low benefits and a high degree of social stigma
for its users, the target group of this form of social insurance was only those who could
not by any means participate in the market - an insurance design made to maximize labor
market performance (Esping-Andersen, 1990, page 22). It was not until the 19th century
the foundations for the Western welfare schemes we know today were laid, during a period
of liberal democracy and restricted suffrage and when the new social challenges occurring
in the aftermath of industrialization coincided with new thoughts on social insurance.
Finally, in the 1880’s, the modern welfare state began to emerge (Flora and Alber, 1981,
page 28). Flora and Heidenheimer (1981) argue that the development of western welfare
states is to be viewed as a part of the modernization process. The two main forces behind
welfare state development were increasing inequality and differentiation on one hand and
the dissolvment of old societal structures on the other. Industrialization, and with it, ur-
banization, created new needs for social protection, and the movement towards universal
suffrage brought the political power to make changes in policies and institutions. Despite
much variation in welfare schemes among European countries, there was a common trend
from the last decades of the 19th century until the World War I that welfare policies were
set by the elites. This changed in the 1920’s, when social democratic forces came to work
and the impact of these started to shape the social insurance schemes.
This development however, was just the beginning - it was not until the era of economic
growth in the years after World War II the development gained speed. Social insurance
started to cover a broader base of inhabitants and a larger number of risks, and existing
benefits were improved (Clasen, 1997, page 2), until it finally became the welfare systems
of today. The welfare states expanded, both in mere pecuniar terms and in the quantity
of insurance programmes:
In Sweden, Germany and United Kingdom, the share of public expenditure in GDP
tripled from 1900 until the end of World War II, and the main reason for this increase was
social expenditures2. In Sweden, these expenditures’ share of the governmental budget
in this time period increased from 30% to 57%, in Germany from 30% to 62% and in UK
from 20% to 47% (Flora and Alber, 1981, page 50). Equivalent numbers for the three
countries in 2003 were 53.8% for Sweden, 56.3% for Germany and 48.4% for the UK3
2Expenditures on education, housing, health and social insurance and assistance
3Expenditures on pensions, cash benefits, sick leave, unemployment services and pay, labor market
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(OECD.Stat: Social Expenditure - Aggregated data, 2008).
Overall, the existence of the social insurance programmes pensions, sick benefits, work
accident insurance and unemployment insurance differed a lot between OECD-countries
in the 1930’s. Work accident insurance was the first to be widely employed, whereas
unemployed insurance was much more rare at this stage. In the 1950’s however, only
sickness insurance was still lacking in some countries, and in 1995, out of 18 OECD
countries4, the only country lacking one of these programmes was the USA - which still
did not have a national sickness benefit programme (Montanari, 2001, page 474-475).
3.2 What is a welfare state?
In the 20th century, welfare state institutions thus developed substantially in North-
America and Western European countries. Although the same classifications of social
insurance programmes were implemented, the political motives behind the programmes,
the degree of universal benefits versus means-testing, the degree of overall redistribution
and consequently the ambitions of the insurance schemes differed from country to country
and over time within countries. In the light of this, a classification of different groups of
welfare states will necessarily be very stylized. Nevertheless, several attempts to group
welfare states according to characteristics have been made. Such attempts focus on what
entitlements citizens have in means of social security benefits.
Titmuss (1958) makes a distinction between residual and universal welfare states:
the former resembles the aforementioned poor laws in the way that it provides social
insurance only when other ways of insurance (the market, or family/social networks)
have failed, and targets only certain groups. The universal welfare states provide, as
their name suggests, insurance to the population as a whole, and welfare provision is
embodied in state institutions.
A more detailed classification of different types of welfare states is found is Esping-
Andersens classic ”The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism”, in which he argues that
the granting of social rights and how the state, the family and the market interact when
it comes to provision of social insurance must be considered when classifying welfare
systems . De-commodification, or when ”a (social) service is rendered as a matter of
right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market”
(Esping-Andersen, 1990, page 22) lies at the core of the classification-question. What
characterizes a welfare state is thus its’ institutional commitment to welfare provision
- what kind of rights a citizen has when he/she finds it necessary to not be a part
training a.o., education excluded
4Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and USA
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of the labor market - meaning unemployment insurance, sickness insurance, pensions,
maternity leave et cetera. The selection of Sweden, Germany and United Kingdom are
the prime examples of the threefold typology of welfare systems: the Scandinavian (most
de-commodifying), the Conservative welfare state, and the Liberal welfare state (the least
de-commodifying), respectively.
The concept of decommodification will be described in further detail in chapters 6.2
and 7.1.
3.3 Recent development in public spending
Another aspect of welfare state development, of course correlated with the development
of entitlements, is the volume of public (and social) spending. From 1950 and well into
the 1990’s, there has been a positive growth in such spending. Now, there are some signs
that could suggest that this growth has been somewhat restrained over the last years - as
figure 1 shows 5. The figure displays public expenditure on social protection as percentage
of GDP for the Germany, Sweden and United Kingdom.
From the figure, it is clear that there has been a positive trend in social expenditure
since 1970, but the development might also indicate that this positive trend is declining.
Shcuknecht and Tanzi (2005) evaluate government expenditure from 1982 to 2000 and
argue that there has been an inverse U - pattern in public spending. In their selection of
22 countries, most saw a growth in public spending until somewhere in the early 1990’s
and from then on there was a decline. Moreover, reduction in transfers and subsidies
constituted half of this decline, although by how much the growth in public spending has
changed differ quite a lot from country to country.
Figure 26 shows the development in the index of decommodification for the same
countries as above. Clearly, the fluctuations, if any, for this index are quite different than
for social protection expenditure. Although for Sweden, there seems to be an inverse U -
pattern in decommodification, for Germany the index seems constant, and for the United
Kingdom the index has increased slowly over the 30-year period.
The result that fluctuations in expenditure on social protection and an index of so-
cial entitlements are so different, comes as no surprise - as decommodification sums up
social rights legislations, this will necessarily change at a slower pace and be subject to
less immediate influence from demographic, political and macroeconomic factors. That
the index for Sweden is so volatile is perhaps more striking than the stable pattern for
Germany.
5Source: Sanz and Velázquez (2007)
6Source: Scruggs and Allan (2006) - the welfare state generosity index
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3.4 What determines welfare state generosity?
We have seen that in the decades after World War II, public and social spending increased,
regardless of type of welfare state. There is a broad consensus that up until 1975-1980,
welfare states expanded. Regarding the years after 1980 however, there has been a wide
debate on in what direction Western welfare states are moving. Are they still expanding?
Are they scaled down? Or is nothing happening at all?
That this is such a difficult question to answer, is of course interesting in itself. But
at the core of this debate is the issue of what really determines welfare state generosity
- and this question can of course be applied to both social spending and welfare state
institutions.
For example, the ”Power Resources”-approach (Korpi and Palme, 1998) focuses on the
welfare state as an arena for distributional conflicts between socioeconomic groups. In
such conflicts, partisan politics will play a significant role . Another approach, formulated
by Pierson (1996), focuses on path dependency in welfare state institutions, arguing that
due to persistent institutions, welfare states remains more or less the same even when
the political or economical climate changes.
Yet another much debated topic is the link between economic integration and welfare
states. While welfare states have expanded since World War II, so have international
trade and capital flows. Higher integration of markets create possibilities for spillover-
effects of government policies, and in addition, citizens are exposed to higher risk. Two
competing hypotheses for in which direction the influence from openness to welfare state
generosity goes, and the theory behind these arguments are elaborated on in the next
section.
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4 Theory
4.1 Compensation versus efficiency
When it comes to welfare state generosity, how do national governments respond to
increased openness? This matter is by no means settled. Two different hypotheses on
the subject can be distinguished:
• The Efficiency Hypothesis states that as openness causes both welfare migration as
well as competition for mobile tax bases and goods between countries, this drives
tax revenues downwards. This, in turn, restrains welfare state generosity.
• The Compensation Hypothesis, on the other hand, focuses on the political incentives
to expand welfare spending to insure the inhabitants against the risks that follows
with a more open economy.
4.1.1 The Compensation Hypothesis
As we have seen, both social spending and openness have increased since 1970. Does this
mean that openness does not threaten the welfare state? Two types of arguments could
substantiate this (Koster, 2008):
First, economic openness causes insecurity: with more integrated markets the citizens
of a country are more vulnerable to external shocks, which may cause unemployment -
and hence a broad social security net is needed. Rodrik (1998) claims that economies that
are more open to international trade are more vulnerable to external shocks. Based on the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem7, we can say that if trade in labour-intensive goods with less
developed countries, which are labour abundant, reduces prices on these goods, then the
real wages of low-skilled workers in the developed countries will decrease - both in absolute
terms and relative to other workers (Krugman, 2008). In Garrett and Mitchell (2001) the
argument is expanded to also include risk from globalization of finance. This process, they
claim, benefits mostly people in the finance sector and not people in general. In addition,
financial globalization can also create unexpected volatility in market conditions - for
which the events in the financial markets in autumn 2008 may serve as a good example.
These factors contribute to increased economic insecurity as well as economic inequality,
and will thus enhance political support for social security provision.
7The theorem says that given two factors of production, constant returns to scale and perfect compe-
tition, a rise in the relative price of a good that uses one input factor more intensively, this will increase
the return to this input factor. The return to the other input factor will decrease (Stolper and Samuelson,
1941). Krugman (2000) points out that an increase in trade with less developed countries has coincided
with a fall in real wages for low-skilled American workers. He also states that although it is natural to
suspect a link between these two facts, the effect of trade on wages is most likely limited.
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Second, to strengthen the ability to compete in the world market, governments need
to invest in the welfare state to create social stability and increase human capital.
4.1.2 The Efficiency Hypothesis
As stated in chapter 2, it seems that growth rates in social spending have for some
countries been zero or negative in the last part of the 1990’s, after decades of positive
growth. Could this mean that openness restrains welfare states, rater than expanding
them?
The potential negative effect of openness on welfare policy goes through the link
of tax legislation and tax competition. Wilson and Wildasin (2004) define tax compe-
tition as "non-cooperative tax setting by independent governments, under which each
government’s policy choices influence the allocation of a mobile tax base among "re-
gions" represented by these governments" (Wilson and Wildasin, 2004, page 1067). E.g.
barriers to international trade are lowered and transportation becomes easier and less
costly with increased economic integration, and consequently relocating business from
one jurisdictions to another will be easier Sinn (2003, page 3), thereby opening up for
tax competition. When taxes are set in this non-cooperative mode, there is an incentive
for each government to adopt policies to secure an inflow of capital, rather than ”losing”
it to other countries.
Tax competition can take two forms: either, the government will shift the tax burden
from mobile bases (capital) to less mobile bases (such as labor and consumption), or
instead it could lower the overall level of taxes (Wilson, 1986, page 296). Thus as tax
bases are becoming more mobile, maintaining the initial level of welfare state generosity
should be harder.
Not only enterprises and capital, but also people have become more mobile. Thus a
mechanism that is closely related to tax competition is welfare migration. Sinn (1994)
makes the argument that with higher mobility of people, there is an incentive for govern-
ments to cut tax rates for the rich to make them stay in the country and cut down on
social benefits to not attract poor immigrants.
In this analysis, I do not take this mechanism into regard, but it is also a clearly
important potential influence on welfare state generosity.
4.2 Tax competition and public spending
The argument that tax competition can lead to inefficiently low taxes and public spending
was articulated by Oates (1972) and later formalized by Wilson (1986) and Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986). The theory has since evolved from these basic, symmetric models
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into more complex ones, including factors as differences in region size and labor mobility
(see e.g. Bucovetsky (1991) and Kessler et al. (2002)). To illustrate the theoretical
effects of tax competition in a simple way, I will here use the model developed by Zodrow
and Mieszkowski (1986)8. The model is originally made to describe a federal state with
a number of local governments where fiscal policy-making has been decentralized, but
the relationship between these governments can also be used to describe how countries
interact, as the same mechanisms in governing tax schemes and public spending are at
work here.
The model assumes a world consisting of N identical jurisdictions, each with an equal
number of identical residents. Each country is endowed with a fixed supply of an immobile
factor (which could be labor, or land, for instance), and together with the capital stock
these constitute the two factors of production in the economy. The national capital stock
K is fixed, and the amount of capital in each jurisdiction is denoted K (NK = K).
Each resident holds an equal share of both the fixed factor and capital, where the latter
can be invested in the country of residence or in another country. Capital is perfectly
mobile between jurisdictions, whereas citizens are perfectly immobile. As a consequence
of mobility, all capital earns the same net return r. The countries are all assumed to be
"small" in the sense that each government perceives r as exogenously given.
Output is produced in each country by perfectly competitive firms. The constant
returns to scale-production function is increasing and concave (suppressing the fixed
factor as argument and letting subscripts denote first and second derivatives):
F (K), FK > 0, FKK < 0 (1)
To include the effect on social spending, public services P in each country is defined
as public purchases of output financed by a source based property tax T on capital or a
lump sum tax H, where the magnitude of H is exogenous. When a jurisdiction impose
the source tax, the equilibrium amount of capital in the country is given by FK − T = r,
which implicitly defines demand for capital in the country as a function of the before-tax
return: K = K(r + T ), where
dK
dT
=
1
FKK
= Φ < 0
-the negative sign on Φ comes from equation 1. Φ represents the distortionary effect of
the property tax on capital: If a country increases T , it will expect the capital stock in
the country to decrease and thereby lower the income from rent on the fixed factor. The
8Presentation based on Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Edwards and Keen (1996) and Wilson and
Wildasin (2004).
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governmental budget constraint is
P = TK(r + T ) +H (2)
Consumers use their income to purchase a consumption good C, which is produced
by private, perfectly competitive firms. These consumers have quasiconcave preferences
over public and private goods, represented by the utility function U(P,C). The amount
of C is determined from the private budget constraint
C = [F (K)− (r + T )K] + rK
N
−H (3)
where the term in square brackets is return to the fixed factor, and the second term
on the RHS is return to capital.
The implications of tax competition in such a model will depend on what policymak-
ers’ intentions are. In one extreme, they can be assumed to be ”benevolent planners”
maximizing local residents’ utility, in another, governments can be perceived as self-
interested Leviathans, taking care of own interests rather than seeking to achieve highest
possible level of utility for the citizens. In the latter case, tax competition would increase
utility in society - as it will set limits to excessively high tax rates posed by self-interested
governments, and ”tax competition among different units rather than tax collusion is an
objective to be sought for it’s own right” (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980, page 186).
Though it might be reasonable to assume that governments in reality lie somewhere
between the two extreme cases, in the model presented here policymakers are assumed
to be of the former type - they set tax rates to maximize residents’ utility subject to the
governmental budget constraint.
Samuelson (1954) shows that a necessary condition for maximizing a social welfare
function is that the sum of marginal rates of substitution between a public and a private
good equals the marginal rate of transformation:
∑
MRS = MRT
If the government provides the public good until this condition is reached, and finances
it by lump-sum taxation, optimum is reached.
In this case, the maximization problem is expressed by substituting 1 and 2 into the
utility function:
max
T
U
{[
F (K)− (r + T )K + rK
N
]
, TK +H
}
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Figure 3: Distortionary effects of tax competition and capital taxes
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If the government could decide on the level of lump sum taxes H as well as T , the
first order conditions for welfare maximization would be:
UP
UC
= 1 (4)
UP
UC
=
1
1− TΦ
K
(5)
Thus, to achieve the optimal allocation of resources, either T or Φ would have to be
zero, such that the marginal rate of substitution between the two goods would be equal
to unity. T could of course not realistically be assumed to be zero; although head taxes
are efficient, the use of them is limited due to distributional/fairness concerns, so the
level of H would normally be restricted (or non-existing) and T non-zero. Because we
are dealing with open economies, neither Φ could be zero because of tax competition.
In sum,
UP
UC
=
1
1− TΦ
K
> 1 (6)
- public goods are underprovided at the margin. The distortionary effect of openness
could be countered by lump-sum taxation, but this tax is exogenous.
Differentiating 2, 3 and 5 with respect to C, P , T and H gives
dT
dH
< 0
13
so when the exogenous level of lump taxes decreases (no matter the initial value of T ),
the use of property taxes increases, and the distortionary effect increases. In addition,
dP
dH
> 0
which means that a reduction in the permitted level of lump sum taxes gives a reduc-
tion in the provision level of public goods. This is illustrated in Figure 39: The production
possibilities frontier is the line AB (with slope equal to minus one), and when only head
taxes are used, this generates the indifference curve UH which maximizes utility. The
consumption levels of private and public goods are CH and PH respectively. If T is non-
zero, then the residents are at a lower level of utility UP , and consume more of C and
less of P (at CP and P P , respectively) than in the optimal case.
9Figure 1 from Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986)
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5 Literature Review
5.1 Empirical strategies
Based on the theory, there are two main empirical approaches to investigate the relation-
ship between openness and compensation/efficiency:
• Investigate the relationship between openness and tax policy
• Investigate the relationship between openness and welfare state generosity
I will analyze the second approach empirically - so to get the full picture of the
empirical dimensions of evidence for the two hypotheses, I review studies on openness
and tax policy to summarize the results for this approach, before I review literature on
openness and welfare as a backdrop for the empirical analysis in the following sections.
5.2 Evidence of tax competition
The theoretical basis for tax competition in the previous section was, as mentioned, orig-
inally made to describe tax competition within countries rather than between them. Sev-
eral studies show that municipalities within countries engage in strategic interaction when
it comes to tax rates, such that tax rates in one jurisdiction depend on the tax rates in
the neighboring jurisdictions, both for property and capital taxes (see e.g. Revelli (2001),
Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), Buettner (2001)). When testing for tax competition
between jurisdictions within countries, the local tax rate is defined as a function of the
neighboring jurisdiction’s tax rate (see Revelli (2005)).
Empirically, for tax policies on the country-level, taxes on capital and corporate in-
come have fallen since 1980 in OECD-countries. At the same time, taxes on wages have
fallen slightly as well, see table 1.
Using the same type of econometric modelling for international tax-competition as the
one described for competition between municipalities, Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002)
find evidence for tax competition in capital taxes between European countries, using
corporate taxes in percentage of GDP as measure of tax burden. Analyzing statutory
capital tax rates, Redoano (2003), reaches the same result and in addition emphasizes
that tax competition in statutory tax rates mainly takes place between geographically
close countries. Devereux et al. (2008) find that in open economies, i.e. with little capital
controls, governments compete in both statutory tax rates and marginal effective tax
rates on capital.
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Table 1: Average tax rates on wages and capital income for OECD-countries
Period Taxes on wages Taxes on Capital a
1980-1985: 18.75% 48%
1986-1990: 18.4% 44.45%
1991-1995: 17.03% 37.9%
1996-2000: 16.04% 35.5%
asource: OECD.stat and OECD tax database. For taxes on corporate and capital income, data on
the years from 1981 onwards are available. For taxes on wages, data for 1979, 1981,1983,1985, 1987,
1989, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000 are available. I have used 1979 in the
1980-05 average for income taxes.
Another way to test the for tax competition is to disregard the existing tax rates in
other countries and test the effect of openness only directly on national tax rates. Using
this approach, Quinn (1997) finds that openness has no effect on capital taxation revenue
in percentage of GDP. Bretschger and Hettich (2002) however, find a robust, negative
relationship between openness and level of effective average corporate taxes10 is for their
panel data on 14 countries from 1967 to 1996. They also find that economic integration
has had a significant positive impact on effective average labor taxes.
Swank and Steinmo (2002) find that both liberalization of capital controls and in-
ternational trade have negative effects on statutory marginal corporate taxes. However,
when investigating effective rather than statutory tax rates, they find that liberalization
of capital controls has a positive effect on labour taxes (which is consistent with the find-
ings of Bretschger and Hettich), and trade has a positive effect on taxes on consumption,
but neither measure of openness has any effect on capital taxes. The theoretical argu-
ment behind this result is that although one sees a shift in statutory taxes from mobile
to more immobile factors, the effective tax rates remains more or less the same because
of the combined effect of the cut in statutory taxes on one hand and fewer tax-based
investment incentives on the other.
Dreher (2006b) also finds a negative effect of openness (measured by the KOF-index of
economic globalization, see appendix A for details) on statutory tax rates. When testing
for the effect on average effective tax rates, he finds a positive effect on capital tax rates,
but no effect on average effective tax rates on labour and consumption. It is then argued
that the reason for this might be that countries compete for capital by setting average
effective tax rates lower, then by increased capital inflow overall tax payment from capital
10There are several ways to calculate effective average tax rates. One much used method is found in
Mendoza et al. (1994) where for instance the effective average tax rate for capital is calculated by taking
the difference between pre-tax and post-tax capital income and divide this by the pre-tax capital income.
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is increased and, consequently, so are the tax ratios11.
Regarding results of the analyses, there is clearly a contrast between the two ways of
modelling tax competition; by modelling tax rate in one country as a reaction to tax rates
in other countries, the results clearly indicate that tax competition plays an important
role. When estimating the effect of openness directly on tax rates, it seems that openness
puts downward pressure on statutory capital/corporate tax rates, and the results are
diverging for effective tax rates.
However, the results for statutory corporate tax rates from the openness-tax rates
analyses seen in the light in the other evidence of tax competition presented here, provide
some evidence for the efficiency hypothesis: the mechanisms described in the previous
chapter do seem to play a significant role when governments are setting tax rates.
The postulated effect of openness from the theory of tax competition presupposes that
this decline in tax rates actually confines governments’ ability to spend. To see if the
efficiency perspective holds when it comes to welfare provision, we need to evaluate the
effect of openness on welfare benefits. This approach is reviewed next, and I also analyze
it empirically in chapter 8.
5.3 Openness and welfare state generosity
A selection of the literature12 is summarized in tables 2 and 3, classified after which
type of dependent variable is used in the analysis 13. The different dependent variables
are classified in three categories, volume (measuring social spending), institutional (mea-
suring entitlements) and inequality (measuring redistribution) - variables. All types of
variables will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. As we can see in table 2, social
spending - variables have been investigated at length, with a variety of country samples,
time periods and estimation methods. Different proxies for openness have also been used.
The authors find both negative, positive and also sometimes no effect of openness on wel-
fare states. For instance, both Hicks and Swank (1992) and Huber et al. (1993) find that
openness, measured by trade/GDP, has a positive impact on social welfare, measured
as welfare spending as percentage of GDP and social security transfers as percentage of
GDP, respectively, both using Generalized Least Squares-analysis. Garrett and Mitchell
11The tax ratio is defined as the ratio of tax revenues to GDP
12There are many studies that investigates this link. Here, I have selected the studies with analyses
that are similar to my own, in terms of objective of the analysis, time dimension etc., and that are also
widely cited.
13The tables are simplifying the results from the various analyses in the sense that when several proxies
for welfare state generosity and/or openness are used, it might be significant effects on some variables
whereas no effect on others, or significant effects of one openness variable but not for others. I here
report in which direction the significant effects go.
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(2001) however, using Fixed Effects-regression, find that international trade has a signif-
icant negative impact on government spending. Yet again, Gemmell et al. (2008) find
evidence for the compensation hypothesis using an error correction model - they find no
effect of openness, in terms of foreign direct investment and trade, on government size,
but a positive effect of stock of inward FDI on social spending in percentage of total
spending. They find no significant effect of trade.
One study uses fiscal redistribution as dependent variable, and this study finds no
effect of openness. Several studies have used unemployment replacement rates as proxy
for welfare state institutions, and the effect seems to go in the negative direction, one
example is Korpi and Palme (2003) who when investigating development in replacement
rates find that openness, measured as trade/GDP, has a positive effect on the risk of
introduction of major cuts in net replacement - i.e. a negative effect on welfare. On
the other hand, there is also an example that indicates the opposite effect: Brady et al.
(2005), who, using an index of decommodification, find positive effects of both net trade
(exports− imports) and openness to trade (exports+ imports) simultaneously.
This overview shows that the results from this empirical approach are ambiguous
and it is difficult to draw a clear conclusion from previous studies. For neither type of
variable used does the effect of openness seem to go in one specific direction. This may of
course be due differences in estimation methods and selection of panels as well as choice
of dependent variable. A further description of estimation methods, choice of dependent
variables and comments on data are found in the following two sections, leading to my
own analysis in section 8.
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6 Empirical strategy
To empirically analyze the effect of openness on welfare state generosity, one needs to
choose both an appropriate measure of welfare state generosity and which type of econo-
metric analysis to use. As the literature review-tables show, several different dependent
variables have been analyzed in different ways. In this chapter I provide an overview over
the problem of choosing a welfare generosity measure as dependent variable as well as
the theory for my empirical method, fixed effects analysis.
6.1 Estimation with panel data
On the background of the theory and literature review, I formulate the econometric model
Welfaret,i = α+ β × opennesst,i + λ× controlst,i + εi,t (7)
where welfarei,t is the choice of dependent variable describing welfare in country i at
time t, α a constant term, openness is the explanatory variable, controls is a vector of
control variables, and finally ε is an error term.
The efficiency hypothesis predicts that β < 0, the compensation hypothesis predicts
β > 0.
As one can see from the results in tables 2 and 3, several econometrics methods have
been used to estimate the relationship in equation 7 when using panel data.
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) - regression gives an estimate of β that minimizes the
sum of squared residuals, i.e. deviances from the estimated value to the observed value.
If the following stochastic assumptions hold (Biørn, 2003):
E(εi,t|opennessi,t, controlsi,t) = 0 (8)
E(εi,tεj,s) =
σ2 for j = i and t = s,0 else (9)
which in turn implies that
E(εi,t) = 0 (10)
var(εi,t) = σ
2 (11)
and we in addition assume no multicollinearity in exogenous variables, then OLS-
regression will yield unbiased and consistent results, i.e.
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E(βˆOLS) = β, p lim βˆOLS = β
and be the so-called Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE).
Some research in this area (see tables 2 and 3) has been carried out by pooled OLS,
Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) or Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS)
analysis. An underlying assumption for using this kind of analysis, with constant inter-
cepts and slopes, is that the model is fully poolable - i.e. that all units, in this case the
18 different countries, will have the same parameter values. Another important impli-
cation of this type of analysis is a potential omitted variable problem. As Garrett and
Mitchell (2001, page 163) point out, OLS might not be a sufficient way of carrying out
the analysis due to the possibility of ”inherent features of different countries that affect
the outcomes of interest, but that are not accurately captured by any of the included
regressors”, and thus cross-country heterogeneity should be taken into account. In other
words, there might be unobserved characteristics determining welfare state generosity
leading to biased and consistent estimates if the omitted variables are correlated with
openness (Greene, 2003).
The simplest way to solve this problem is to allow for intra-unit heterogeneity by
using fixed effects or random effects models (Beck, 2006). These methods allow for differ-
ent intercepts, but has constant slopes. The fixed effects (FE)-estimator (or the ”within
group”-estimator) utilizes variation within each observation unit. The between effects
(BE) -estimator (or the ”between groups”-estimator) utilizes variation between observa-
tion units. The OLS-estimator from the pooled data is an unweighted average of the FE
and BE-estimators. The random effects (RE) -estimator provides a weighted average of
FE and BE-estimators, using information from both variation on each observation units
as well as variation between them (Kennedy, 2003).
These methods use either dummies for country to capture country-specific effects(a
one-way model), or both country and time-dummies (a two-way model). For observations
on i = 1...N countries for t = 1...T time periods, the two way model is formulated as
Welfarei,t = α+ β × opennessi,t + λ× controlsi,t + µi + γt + εi,t (12)
where µi and γi are dummies for country and year, respectively. The equation is
estimated by OLS. This model will then have intercepts that vary over country as well
as time.
In sum, I choose to carry out the analysis by estimating equation 12 by FE-regression.
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6.1.1 Fixed versus random effects
The RE-estimator is more efficient than FE because it utilizes information from both
within and between estimators, but it will be biased if its composite error (consisting of
the ”usual” error term and a ”random intercept” term - measuring to which degree an
individual’s intercept differs from the overall intercept) is correlated with the regressors
(Kennedy, 2003). The FE-estimator will in any case be unbiased because it includes
dummies for the intercepts and is always consistent.
Using the Hausman test to test the null hypothesis that the RE-coefficients are the
same as the FE-coefficients, I find that it might be safe to use RE-estimation in very
few cases only. As the results from these RE-estimations do not change the result of the
analysis in any way, I use FE-regression to get consistent results throughout the analysis.
6.2 How to analyse welfare state generosity - the dependent vari-
able problem
The theory of tax competition predicts that the effect of openness is negative, and the
compensation hypothesis postulates the opposite. But what exactly is welfare state gen-
erosity? To analyse the compensation versus efficiency - question empirically, one needs
to define the precise aspect of welfare one is interested in. Hence all empirical research
on welfare state change face the Dependent Variable Problem - or how to ”conceptualize,
operationalize and measure change within welfare states” (Clasen and Siegel, 2007, page
4). What kind of measure of welfare one chooses will necessarily have an impact on the
outcome of the analysis. So when measuring how welfare policies have developed, what
exactly should the measure be?
What will be a natural starting point for measuring changes in welfare programmes
will depend on what one considers to be the prime characteristics of a welfare state. One
option is to base the analysis on the institutions of the welfare state, looking at changes
in welfare program structure over time - what Clasen and van Oorschot (2002) label the
”legal” perspective (and which I label the ”institutional perspective”), as it is supposed to
measure qualitative changes in the welfare state rather than quantitative.
Another way of defining welfare state change is related to welfare programmes. Cut-
backs in a particular benefit, or in the total amount of social expenditure - this ”volume”
perspective (Clasen and van Oorschot, 2002) measures quantitative changes in welfare
state generosity.
Yet another point of departure for measuring change is to look at how governmental
transfers affect the distribution of disposable income.
Summing up, traditionally there have been three main ways of approaching the de-
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pendent variable problem:
1. Measuring changes in income distributions - the inequality perspective
2. Measuring changes in transfers - the volume perspective
3. Measuring changes in welfare programmes - the institutional perspective
The first has the advantage that it measures exactly the changes in the structure of
welfare state entitlements, the second that it describes how changes in the quantity of
transfers the citizens actually get, the third that it measures the distributive effects of
these transfers.
These measures are not necessarily strongly correlated - for instance a small change
in an institutional arrangement could have large implications for many inhabitants in
a country, and likewise a profound change of structure in a welfare state system might
not be of great importance when implemented. As an illustration, in 1982, a part of
the Danish pension system was restructured: in the traditional universal welfare system,
means testing in old age pensions were introduced (Green-Pedersen, 2004, page 10). This
had a significant impact on entitlements for inhabitants between 67 and 69 years of age
only, and would according to the volume perspective be considered as negligible. In the
institutional perspective however, this is a clear deviation from the characteristics of the
Scandinavian universal welfare state, and could thus be considered as a very important
institutional change.
Hence a first-best solution to the dependent variable problem would be a combination
of these three, or at least the second and the third, such that aspects of social rights and
volume of redistributive transfers both have a say in the measure of welfare generosity.
Such a measure is not available (and would indeed be very hard to construct), and the
option for empirical research is to use one or more of the three approaches.
6.2.1 Examining welfare programmes - the volume perspective
The research on openness and welfare state policies has to a large extent been focusing
on the volume perspective, as the data for government spending are quite reliable and
easy to collect, and to investigate the link between the two competing hypotheses on
compensation and efficiency and government spending on social security is relatively
straightforward. The link between spending variables and welfare state generosity is not
so straightforward, however; social spending says nothing about exact entitlements or
quality of welfare state programmes.
This approach can be further divided in two subcategories: both social spending and
total government spending, or government size, have been used as volume proxies for
24
welfare.
Social spending: As Siegel (2007) points out, social expenditure is the largest
component of total governmental outlays in all OECD democracies, and can thus be
a very useful tool for comparing welfare states and their development over time. Social
expenditure-variables are sensitive to other variables such as political decisions, social
need and the size of GDP, which as a consequence need to be controlled for in empirical
analysis. In addition, Green-Pedersen (2007, page 19) points out that the effects of polit-
ical decisions on social spending are not necessarily immediate - there will be some time
lag before we see the implications of legislative changes on social outlays, and moreover,
it is hard to distinguish whether a high welfare budget means higher welfare or simply
an inefficient welfare system.
Government size: Following the same kind of argument for social spending as
welfare variable, total government expenditure is also used in welfare research. Rodrik
(1998), who finds evidence for the compensation hypothesis using this variable (and also
by using social spending), simply states that ”government expenditures are used to provide
social insurance against external risks”. Welfare state generosity is then conceptualized
not only as the social aspect of public spending, but to include all other categories of
public spending as well, and welfare state generosity is defined in a very broad way.
6.2.2 Examining welfare programmes - the inequality perspective
Another starting point for examining government policies and spending is to look at
how the states redistribute income among the citizens. To make the link between re-
distribution and welfare plausible, one must take a utilitarian approach - making the
non-controversial assumption that utility is increasing and concave in income x,
U(x), Ux > 0, Uxx < 0 (13)
such that redistribution from richer to poorer persons actually enhances overall utility
and hence welfare.
This link is made dubious however, by the fact that an inequality index does not say
anything about the level of welfare - clearly, a poor country with a low inequality score
does not necessarily have better welfare than a rich country with a higher inequality
score.
A popular choice of inequality measure is the Gini-coefficient, calculated by the for-
mula
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G = 1− 2
∫ 1
0
L(X) dX.
where L(X) is the Lorenz curve, which is a graphical representation of the cumulative
distribution function which shows for the bottom X% of individuals, what percentage of
total income this fraction has. The Gini-coefficient takes a value between 0 and 1 - the
closer to 0, the more evenly distributed is income in the society. If the coefficient takes
the value of 1, only one person gets all the income.
To see the effect of the welfare state on the Gini-coefficient, Mahler and Jesuit (see
Mahler and Jesuit, 2004, 2006, LIS, 2008)) have constructed a ”Fiscal Redistribution Data
Set” using data from the Luxembourg Income Study, where the Gini-coefficient on gross
income, before taxes have been deducted and social transfers added, is contrasted with
the coefficient on disposable income - i.e after taxes and transfers. Thus, this pre/post
approach gives us the opportunity to see how governmental redistribution evolves over
time.
Bergh (2005) argues that this use of the inequality index is problematic because the
welfare state system will necessarily affect both the market income as well as the income
after taxes and transfers. Moreover, it is impossible to distinguish the effect of changes
in the tax system from changes in transfers.
This approach is quite new, and as table 3 shows, not much has yet been written
using the fiscal redistribution variable.
6.2.3 Examining welfare programmes - the institutional perspective
The last approach to conceptualizing welfare state change is, instead of focusing the
volume of transfers or redistributive effects of these transfers, to investigate changes in
the institutional characteristics of the social transfers citizens in a country are entitled to
get.
Are there changes in the pension scheme? Increasing or decreasing unemployment
benefits? More or less means testing?
Emphasizing what the welfare state system actually intends to provide for the inhab-
itants of a country gives another picture of welfare state generosity than merely social
security spending.
The obvious drawback of this approach is that summing up all the entitlements in a
welfare system in one single index cannot be done easily. One solution has been to focus on
replacement rates, as these are one of the core variables for institutional characterization.
Following Esping-Andersen, the ideal would be a an index of decommodification -
and he actually does construct a measure of decommodification in pension-, sickness-
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and unemployment benefits for the US, New Zealand, Japan and Western European
countries in 1980 (Esping-Andersen, 1990, page 50), but these are measured relatively
and the data is not made public - so the index is impossible to update (Lindbom, 2001).
Detailed datasets on core social security variables exist (see, for instance, Korpi and
Palme (2007)). A few attempts have been made to construct indexes for social entitle-
ments from such data. One prime example is Lyle Scrugg’s decommodification index (see
Scruggs (2004)).
The empirical research on institutional measures has mainly focused on certain enti-
tlements, often replacement rates, rather than an index to describe several entitlements.
A decommodification index consist mainly of sickness, pensions and unemployment ben-
efits, so replacement rates in these programmes may therefore serve as proxy for welfare
state institutions.
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7 Data
The data used is cross-section time-series data, with yearly observations from 1970/1980
(depending on which welfare variable investigated) until 2000 for 18 OECD countries.
The selection of countries is Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.
7.1 Dependent variables
There are three main categories of dependent variables: volume variables, inequality
variables and legal variables.
Volume variables:
Previous studies use mainly three different variables in this category: from OECD-
data, a measure of social security transfers in percentage of GDP (SSTRAN ), social
transfers in percentage of GDP (SOCX ) (which is very often used) and total public
expenditure, which is a proxy for government size (PUBEXP).
The difference between the first two variables is that SSTRAN covers social assis-
tance grants and welfare benefits paid by general government benefits for sickness, old-
age, family allowances, social assistance grants and unfunded employee welfare benefits,
whereas SOCX includes total social public expenditure, meaning expenditure related to
old age, survivors, family, health care, active labour market programmes, unemployment
and housing as well as some other social policy areas (e.g. income maintenance and
emergency relief) (OECD, 2007), and is thus a more widely defined variable.
The SSTRAN -variable has the advantage that it covers the years 1970-2000, where
SOCX only has the time span 1980-2003. In addition, a more narrow definition might
have the advantage of being less noisy than a variable that contains a much wider selection
of factors. As stated in chapter 6.2., a first best solution to the dependent variable problem
would contain both welfare spending and welfare institutions. By definition, SSTRAN is
closer to this first-best than SOCX, as it follows specified social transfers over time rather
than gross public social expenditure.
Although SSTRAN has been used in several studies, see e.g. Huber et al. (1993),
Garrett (2001) and Brady et al. (2005), there is a drawback of using this variable - its
validity is questionable. As can be seen in figure 4, although in several cases SSTRAN
and SOCX seem to follow the same trend, for some countries SSTRAN has some abrupt
changes of level, both positive and negative, which seem very puzzling - consider for
instance the graphs for Italy, Japan and the Netherlands. This suggests that using
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SSTRAN in empirical research is problematic.
In sum, the three traditional variables are either too widely defined (PUBEXP and
SOCX ), have too short time span (SOCX ) or are most likely simply invalid for inference
(SSTRAN ).
To solve this problem, I use a new variable similar to SSTRAN, namely public spend-
ing on social protection, SOCPRO, as found in Sanz and Velázquez (2007) and Gemmell
et al. (2008). This variable is based on the COFOG classification of social protection
(UN, 2000) and includes sickness and disability benefits, old age pension, unemployment
compensation benefits, family and child allowances and assistance to groups with special
needs (young, elderly and handicapped). The data for this variable goes from 1970 until
199814, so it has both the advantage of a long time dimension, as well being more narrow
than total social expenditure.
As both SSTRAN and SOCX have been popular social spending measures in welfare
state research (see tables 2 and 3), I include both SSTRAN and SOCX in the analysis
to compare results, and I also include PUBEXP to see if openness has any effect on
government size.
Inequality variable: I use the variable Absolute Redistribution, REABS, i.e. Ginipre−
Ginipost. However, the LIS Fiscal Redistribution Dataset (mentioned in chapter 6.2.2)
contains only a few observations - for my panel and time dimension only 63 observations
altogether, which makes substantial estimation difficult. However, Solt (2008) has re-
cently constructed pre-and post Gini measures by standardizing the UN World Income
Inequality Database (WIID) using a missing-data algorithm, and collected these in the
SWIID-dataset. I have computed the REABS -variables from this dataset.
Institutional variable: Esping-Andersen has a ranking of welfare states according to
scores on the decommodification index in 1980. An attempt to reconstruct this index has
been made in Scruggs and Allan (2006). So in this category I use Scruggs’ Generosity
Index 15 labeled GEN, described in table 4. The classification of countries is altered
slightly from the Esping-Andersen typology to the Scruggs-typology, as can be seen in
the table.
7.2 The Independent Variable Problem
As several proxies for openness have been found in previous literature, one stands out
when considering frequency of use: trade with other countries as percentage of GDP.
14There is no data available for the United States, so the sample size is then down to 17 countries.
15Which is based on the Esping-Andersen decommodification index, but the calculation is somewhat
different.
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Figure 4: Volume variables 1970-2000
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Table 4: Classification of Welfare States according to degree of decommodification, 1980
Author Welfare State Countries
Esping-Andersen: Universal: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria,
Belgium, the Netherlands
Conservative: Germany, France, Italy, Finland, Switzerland,
Japan
Liberal: United States, United Kingdom, Canada,
Ireland, New Zealand, Australia
Scruggs: Universal: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Switzerland
Conservative: Germany, France, Finland, New Zealand, Canada,
Austria
Liberal: United States, United Kingdom, Ireland,
Australia, Japan, Italy
As Rodrik (1997, page 58) says about using trade as proxy for openness:”Imperfect as
it is, this measure should capture to some extent the manoeuvering room that domestic
agents - private and public - have”. For instance Garrett (1995) and Bretschger and
Hettich (2002) simply assume that capital mobility and openness to trade in a country
are positively correlated.
Consequently, I use international trade as my measure of openness. Economic open-
ness, however, is a concept with many facets. It would therefore be useful to evaluate
several aspects of economic integration to confirm results - and to check if the net ef-
fect of openness might be different than indicated by international trade. In sensitivity
analysis I discuss this in detail by utilizing (FDI)16 as openness-measures, to see if the
effects are the same. I also utilize another alternative openness-measure; the KOF-index
of economic globalization (Dreher, 2006a) is an attempt to sum up the effects of different
aspects of openness. The index includes both actual flows (trade and FDI) as well as
normative restrictions (capital account restrictions, trade barriers). The index takes a
value between 0 and 100. Details on the variables included, weighting and calculation
method can be found in appendix A.
16The OECD-benchmark definition of FDI says that ”Foreign direct investment reflects the objective of
obtaining a lasting interest by a resident entity in one economy (”direct investor”) in an entity resident in
an economy other than that of the investor (”direct investment enterprise”). The lasting interest implies
the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant
degree of influence on the management of the enterprise. Direct investment involves both the initial
transaction between the two entities and all subsequent capital transactions between them and among
affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated.” (OECD, 1999, page 7-8).
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Table 5: Expected effect on welfare variables by explanatory and control variables
Variable Expected Effect
Openness Positive/Negative
Population size Negative
Fraction of population under 15 years (PLT15) Positive
Fraction of population above 65 years (PO65) Positive
Unemployment (UNEMP) Positive
Economic growth (EGROWTH) Negative
Percentage of left seats in cabinet (LEFTCAB) Positive
Percentage of center seats in cabinet (CNCAB) Positive
GDP per capita (RGDPL) Negative
7.3 Control variables
As mentioned at the beginning, many variables apart from economic integration are likely
to affect welfare state generosity. To minimize the chance of getting omitted variable bias
I add a number of control variables to the analysis.
7.3.1 Demographic variables
The fraction of population under 15, PLT15, and the fraction of population over 65,
PO65 are included because a high share of either of these is likely to be associated with
higher government spending, due to pensions, child care benefits et cetera. I also add the
control variable population size, POP, as a proxy for country size, as there has been some
debate on whether positive effects of openness on government size really stems from the
relationship between government size and country size 17.
7.3.2 Macroeconomic variables
First, I include economic growth, EGROWTH. Bretschger and Hettich (2002) argue there
are two aspects of economic growth: first, in a given time, the higher growth in a country,
the lower should the capital taxation be, and hence result in a lower level of welfare state
generosity; second, that growth in itself might take care of the higher risk citizens are
exposed to by increased openness. In sum, economic growth is likely to be negatively
associated with welfare variables.
I also control for size of GDP, RGDPL - as stated earlier, when using measures like
17See Alesina and Wacziarg (1998), who find that governments are smaller in larger countries, and
smaller countries tend to be more open - which can account for the fact that openness is correlated with
government size, and the counterargument in Ram (2008).
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social spending as percentage of GDP, it is important to control for the size of GDP as
the dependent variable will be sensitive to the size of GDP as well as the social outlays.
A higher level of GDP should thus be associated with a lower level of welfare spending.
Unemployment, UNEMP, is included as higher unemployment is likely to put upward
pressure on government spending, especially regarding income transfers.
7.3.3 Political variables
Fraction of left seats in parliament and the fraction of center seats in parliament are both
included as they could be associated with higher public spending. As (Huber et al., 1993)
I use left (LEFTCAB) and center (CNCAB) seats, respectively, as percentage of seats
held by all government parties, as these are expected to have more direct impact on social
policy than number of seats in parliament.
The expected signs of coefficients in estimating equation 7 are summarized in table 5.
Information about the data is summarized in table 6.
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8 Results
8.1 Pooled OLS-results
As a benchmark, I present the results for effect of international trade on welfare state
generosity when using pooled OLS. Table 7 shows results for all 3 categories of dependent
variables, 6 variables altogether : columns 1-4 display the results for the volume variables,
columns 5 and 6 for the institutional variable and redistribution variable, respectively.
The results from this model suggests that international trade has a significant positive
effect on SOCPRO and PUBEXP, whereas no effect on the other variables. This analysis
thus suggests evidence in favor of the compensation hypothesis, but only for volume
variables.
However, as discussed in chapter 7, I suspect that this type of analysis might yield
biased and inconsistent estimators due to omitted country-specific effects. F-tests for
dummies for country clearly reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients for these are
the same, for all my dependent variables18. Because of significant country-specific effects,
I proceed to take these effects into consideration by estimating equation 12. The results
for this analysis are discussed in the next paragraph.
8.2 Fixed effects-analyis
The main results from the analysis, i.e. estimating equation 12, are found in table 8.
The results are strikingly different from the pooled OLS-estimation, now, the coeffi-
cient for international trade is overall negative, and it is statistically significant for two of
the volume variables, SOCPRO and SOCX as well for the inequality variable REABS. For
SOCPRO, one standard deviation increase in international trade (29 percentage points)
reduces public spending on social protection by 2 percentage points, the corresponding
number for SOCX is 1.2 percentage points. For the REABS -variable, one standard devi-
ation increase in trade gives 3.5 points unit reduction in the difference Ginipre−Ginipost,
i.e. the difference in inequality measured on the Gini-scale increases by 3.5 points. A
simple illustration of this result: in Sweden in 2000, the value of REABS was 26.2. An
increase in international trade of two standard deviations would then decrease this value
almost down to the level of REABS for the United Kingdom, which is 18.6 in the same
year. Because this variable contains both taxes and transfers, this effect might be due to
either a less progressive tax system or less transfers - or of course a combination of both.
For PUBEXP international trade has no effect.
My result is thus the opposite of Rodrik (1998) - trade does not increase government
18This also holds for dummies for year.
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Table 7: OLS-regressions with time fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SSTRAN SOCPRO SOCX PUBEXP GEN REABS
TRADE/GDP 0.06 0.08∗∗ 0.04 0.10∗ 0.08 -0.01
(1.45) (2.17) (1.55) (1.89) (1.72) (-0.46)
POP -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00∗ -0.00 0.00∗
(-1.53) (-1.60) (-1.22) (-2.00) (-0.95) (1.81)
PLT15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(1.23) (0.90) (0.59) (1.41) (0.60) (-1.35)
PO65 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00 -0.00
(1.53) (1.84) (1.41) (1.95) (0.87) (-1.52)
UNEMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.61) (0.26) (1.42) (1.29) (-0.43) (-0.75)
EGROWTH -0.45∗∗ -0.58∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗ -1.01∗∗∗ -0.37 -0.25
(-2.85) (-2.67) (-3.06) (-2.94) (-1.56) (-1.23)
LEFTCAB 0.01 0.04∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.03 0.04∗∗ 0.02∗
(0.86) (2.49) (1.88) (1.43) (2.46) (1.77)
CNCAB -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
(-1.33) (-0.22) (-0.07) (-0.27) (0.36) (-0.67)
RGDPL -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00∗∗ -0.00
(-1.08) (0.53) (-0.18) (-0.92) (2.34) (-0.63)
Observations 512 459 364 500 530 478
Est. Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
t statistics in parentheses
Constant term and dummy for time included in the analysis,
but not reported.
Time dimension: 1970-2000, except 1980-2000 for SOCX, 1970-1998 for SOCPRO
and 1971-2000 for GEN.
Number of countries: 18, except 17 for SOCPRO.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: Trade and welfare state generosity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SSTRAN SOCPRO SOCX PUBEXP GEN REABS
TRADE/GDP -0.02 -0.07∗∗∗ -0.04∗ -0.06 -0.00 -0.12∗∗
(-1.42) (-4.02) (-1.83) (-1.67) (-0.23) (-2.17)
POP -0.00 -0.00∗∗ -0.00 -0.00∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗ 0.00
(-1.34) (-2.17) (-0.42) (-2.73) (-2.94) (0.78)
PLT15 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00
(2.11) (1.74) (0.71) (2.08) (2.12) (0.05)
PO65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗ -0.00∗
(1.50) (1.69) (0.87) (3.27) (2.33) (-1.77)
UNEMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.36) (1.44) (1.33) (-1.04) (1.69) (1.13)
EGROWTH -0.10∗∗ -0.12∗∗ -0.23∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗ -0.09
(-2.14) (-2.39) (-2.59) (-4.03) (-2.37) (-0.73)
LEFTCAB -0.01∗ -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.00
(-2.08) (-0.14) (-1.45) (-0.93) (0.87) (-0.20)
CNCAB -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02∗ 0.01 -0.01
(-1.65) (-0.19) (-0.52) (-1.97) (0.94) (-1.46)
RGDPL -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00
(-3.24) (-3.57) (-3.14) (-6.14) (4.83) (0.63)
Observations 512 459 364 500 530 478
Est. Method FE FE FE FE FE FE
t statistics in parentheses
Constant term and dummies for year and country included,
but not reported.
See notes to table 7.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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size, nor does it increase social spending. Because I use a long panel and find significant
country - and year specific effects, and Rodrik’s analysis ignores this dimension by using
only the average of three years as observation, this might account for the difference in
results.
Based on how they are defined, the effect of openness on three social spending variables
should be correlated, in particular the effects on SSTRAN and SOCPRO. But while there
are significant effects of openness for SOCPRO and SOCX, the result for SSTRAN has
the same sign with a lower point estimate in absolute value - but is not significant. As
I have already stated, results using SSTRAN are most likely not trustworthy, and this
result substantiates this claim.
As one of the aims with this analysis was to see if the effect of openness is correlated
among different welfare variables, I have confirmed this with respect to social expenditure
variables and redistribution. In the light of this, we could expect that openness would have
a similar effect on generosity (GEN ). That this is not the case, provides some substance
for theories which emphasize that welfare state institutions hardly change much over time
(see Pierson (1996)), and by that also provide counter-evidence for theories of welfare
state convergence as a consequence of increased openness19. In other words, we find that
institutional arrangements for welfare benefits are not altered as a result of increased
openness, but instead openness exerts downward pressure on how much is spent on these
entitlements and possibly also on redistribution via a progressive tax system.
While social spending and fiscal redistribution are negatively affected by openness,
the size of the negative effect is not very large. There is no sign that increased eco-
nomic integration undermines the welfare state, openness rather restrains it somewhat.
Although the studies summarized in table 2 differ in whether they find evidence for the
compensation hypothesis or the efficiency hypothesis, most of them seem to agree on that
the effect of openness is not very large; where Brady et al. (2005), using PCSE-analysis,
find that a one percentage point increase in international trade decreases SOCX by 0.1
percentage point (compared to 0.04 percentage points here), e.g. Hicks and Swank (1992),
using GLS, find that a one percentage point increase in international trade increases so-
cial spending in percentage of GDP by 0.02 percentage points. An exception is Quinn
(1997), who finds that the corresponding number, using OLS-analysis, is 0.6.
19As described in chapter 7.1, the welfare state generosity index is based on the decommodification
index, which divides welfare states into three categories (see table 4). I also run the same regression
for the countries within each category to see if there could be different results with regard to different
welfare states, but the effect of openness is still insignificant for each category.
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8.2.1 Effect of control variables
The differences between the categories of dependent variables are evident also with respect
to the control variables included.
Regarding the demographic variables, the small point estimate for population size
comes out with a significant negative effect for SOCPRO, PUBEXP and GEN, which to
some extent confirms Alesina and Wacziarg (1998)s hypothesis that larger countries have
smaller governments - for this panel, the effect is just very small.
Fraction of population under 15 and over 65 years of age are both significant for
PUBEXP where the effect is positive, but small. For SSTRAN, population under 15 is
positive and significant, and for DECOM population over 65 is positive and significant.
This confirms the expectation that an increase in fraction of population that are not
part of the workforce can cause higher demand for social spending, and moreover, it also
influences institutional arrangements.
However, for REABS, PO65 is negative and significant. That an increase in the frac-
tion of population that is retired should lead to less redistribution, is rather unexpected.
For the macroeconomic variables, the effect of unemployment is overall negligible,
except for SOCPRO where the positive point estimate is significant at the 5% level.
The most interesting control variable turns out to be economic growth - the influence
of this variable on all the volume variables is unambiguous; it clearly has a negative
effect. For SOCPRO one standard deviation increase in economic growth (2.5 percentage
points) gives a 0.3 percentage point decrease. It is also negative and significant for the
institutional variable GEN. This result is similar to that in e.g. Garrett and Mitchell
(2001).
While the most common argument for this mechanism is simply that in good times,
less benefits are needed, Bretschger and Hettich (2002) link economic growth to the
theory of tax competition: because tax rates are predetermined (i.e. the decisions are
made before the taxes are collected), the revenues from taxes will increase when growth
is high and decrease when growth is low. By taking exogenous business cycle shocks
into account, their reasoning is that in a positive shock, the domestic interest rate will
increase, and hence increase capital outflows, whereas in a negative shock, it will decrease
- and the country will increase capital inflow. Thus a rational government in the tax-
competition model will lower tax rates during the positive shock to attract capital in
spite of the high interest rate.
Level of GDP per capita has a negative and significant effect for all volume vari-
ables, and a significant positive effect for generosity - which is the opposite of what I
hypothesized, but the effect is very small.
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For redistribution, however, there is no effect of economic growth or level of GDP.
The political variables turn out not to be very influential - and the few significant
point estimates (on SSTRAN and PUBEXP) are actually negative. In contrast, Huber
et al. (1993) find a positive effect for CNCAB on social benefits, but they also find a
significant negative effect of LEFCAB on the same variable.
These results seem a bit suprising, but estimating causal effects of political control
without bias is difficult because parties are not randomly selected into government, and
a correlation does not necessarily imply causality, see Pettersson-Lidbom (2006). The
results should thus be interpreted with care.
The dependent variable that stands out the most when it comes to effect of control
variables, is redistribution: economic growth has a negative effect on all volume variables
and the institutional variable, but none on redistribution. The same is true for level of
GDP per capita. In fact, the only control variable which actually influences redistribution
is fraction of population over 65 years old, and this influence is very small.
8.3 Sensitivity analyses
To ensure that the results in table 8 are robust, this section provides tests for business
cycle effects, effects of other openness-measures and for possible endogeneity problems -
both for the explanatory variable and for control variables.
8.3.1 Testing for effects of business-cycle fluctuations
If the results in table 8 are driven by business cycle mechanisms (i.e. both the dependent
variable and some of the right hand side variables of equation 12 fluctuate with the state
of the economy), rather than displaying real effects of the explanatory variable and control
variables, I check for this by estimating equation 12 using 5-year averages - see table 9.
This robustness check is particularly important for the variables that are measured in
terms of GDP (which in this case are all volume variables, trade, economic growth and
of course level of GDP). This could potentially cause a spurious relationship between
openness and welfare state generosity. If the results are indeed driven by such effects, I
would expect to find that the significant results in table 8 to disappear when estimating
on the averages. But the negative effect of trade is still significant for SOCPRO, SOCX
and REABS - the significance level for SOCX actually increases. The absolute value of
the point estimates for SOCPRO and REABS decreases, whereas for SOCX it increases,
so there is no reason to suspect that table 8 displays a spurious relation between openness
and welfare state generosity.
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Table 9: Fixed effects analysis with 5-year averages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SSTRAN SOCPRO SOCX PUBEXP GEN REABS
(mean) tradegdp -0.02 -0.05∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.04 0.00 -0.11∗∗
(-0.83) (-2.50) (-2.97) (-0.99) (0.09) (-2.15)
(mean) pop -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00∗∗ 0.00
(-0.63) (-1.46) (-1.62) (-0.55) (-2.67) (0.70)
(mean) plt15 0.00 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00∗ -0.00
(1.53) (1.28) (1.89) (0.71) (1.99) (-0.01)
(mean) po65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00∗ -0.00
(0.77) (0.96) (1.15) (1.22) (2.07) (-1.39)
(mean) unemp 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.17) (1.21) (1.17) (-1.70) (1.67) (0.91)
(mean) egrowth -0.32 -0.30 -0.57∗∗ -1.35∗∗∗ -0.11 -0.09
(-1.55) (-1.57) (-2.50) (-3.37) (-0.58) (-0.24)
(mean) leftcab -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.00
(-1.68) (0.09) (-0.48) (-0.88) (0.91) (-0.18)
(mean) cncab -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.04 0.01 -0.02
(-1.12) (-0.13) (-0.26) (-1.43) (1.02) (-1.22)
(mean) rgdpl -0.00∗ -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00
(-1.86) (-2.93) (-0.87) (-4.66) (5.90) (0.55)
Observations 105 102 90 102 108 103
Est. Method FE FE FE FE FE FE
t statistics in parentheses
Constant term and dummies for countries and 6 5-year periods included in
the analysis, but not reported.
See notes to table 7.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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8.3.2 Impact of FDI and the KOF-index
International trade is only one aspect of economic openness, and although it is widely
used as explanatory variable in analyses similar to the one here, it is useful to investigate
other aspects of openness as well. I do this by using stock of inward FDI , INWSTOCK,
as explanatory variable. I also utilize the KOF-index of economic globalization, as this
index is meant to sum up the effects of different dimensions of openness.
Here, I exempt SSTRAN, SOCX and PUBEXP from the analysis and focus on my
preferred volume variable SOCPRO.
In these regressions, the sample size decreases due to missing values of INWSTOCK -
consequently I estimate equation 12 with both trade, inward stock of FDI and KOF-index
on this smaller sample.
For SOCPRO, the effect of trade is insignificant in this smaller sample (column 1 in
table 10). But the effect of FDI is negative and significant, and in column 4 they are both
negative and significant simultaneously. The KOF-index gives a positive and significant
effect on SOCPRO20, which seems somewhat puzzling seen in the light of the results for
the two other variables. When including this variable with the two others in column 4,
the effect is no longer significant.
Inward stock of FDI also has a negative effect on generosity (column 2 in table 11),
and the KOF-index has a positive effect for this variable too. For fiscal redistribution in
table 12, there are no significant effects of openness.
For the control variables, one result that stands out is that fraction of center seats in
the parliament now clearly increases generosity, whereas it decreases redistribution. The
negative effect of level of GDP per capita still holds for for both SOCPRO and GEN.
I also estimate the same regression using inward FDI flows (I do not report the results)
and find the coefficient for this variable is zero for all dependent variables.
The KOF-index has two aspects: actual flows and restrictions to openness, see table
13 in appendix A. To investigate the positive effect of the KOF-index more closely, I
run the same regression with only the actual flows - aspect of the index (containing the
variables described in the upper part of table 13) to control for any effects that are implied
by the normative factors and thus would cause different results than trade/GDP (I do
not report the results).
In the full sample, this empirical KOF-index is still positive and significant for SOCPRO,
but in the smaller sample, the effect is zero on all three dependent variables. As this em-
pirical index contains precisely data on trade, FDI and portfolio investment21, it seems
20The effect of the KOF-index on SOCPRO is positive and significant also in the full sample.
21Portfolio investments are just foreign direct investments with a portfolio share too low to be defined
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Table 10: SOCPRO and different openness-measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SOCPRO SOCPRO SOCPRO SOCPRO
TRADE/GDP -0.04 -0.12∗∗∗
(-1.32) (-4.54)
INWSTOCK -0.12∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗
(-3.54) (-5.76)
KOF-INDEX 0.11∗ 0.08
(1.76) (1.58)
POP -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00∗
(-1.39) (-1.36) (-1.73) (-2.02)
PLT15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00∗
(1.30) (1.11) (1.71) (1.79)
PO65 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗
(1.76) (1.25) (2.33) (1.87)
UNEMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.94) (1.30) (1.26) (0.82)
EGROWTH -0.11∗ -0.16∗∗ -0.19∗∗ -0.03
(-2.01) (-2.65) (-2.33) (-0.47)
LEFTCAB -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.23) (-0.03) (0.04) (0.24)
CNCAB -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(-0.19) (0.07) (-0.22) (0.11)
RGDPL -0.00∗∗ -0.00∗∗ -0.00∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗
(-2.87) (-2.68) (-2.40) (-4.12)
Observations 269 269 269 269
Est. Method FE FE FE FE
t statistics in parentheses
Constant term and dummies for year and country included,
but not reported.
The sample size is now to 269 observations due to
missing observations on INWSTOCK
.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 11: Generosity and different openness-measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GEN GEN GEN GEN
TRADE/GDP 0.02 -0.01
(0.34) (-0.17)
INWSTOCK -0.07∗ -0.06
(-1.90) (-1.50)
KOF-INDEX 0.12∗ 0.10∗
(1.89) (1.76)
POP -0.00∗ -0.00∗ -0.00∗ -0.00∗
(-1.83) (-1.84) (-2.05) (-2.03)
PLT15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.36) (1.44) (1.65) (1.69)
PO65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.54) (1.41) (1.73) (1.61)
UNEMP 0.00 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00
(1.47) (1.42) (1.75) (1.30)
EGROWTH -0.22∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗
(-3.05) (-3.62) (-4.22) (-3.11)
LEFTCAB 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.87) (1.27) (1.17) (1.55)
CNCAB 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗
(3.38) (3.19) (3.12) (2.72)
RGDPL 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗
(2.13) (2.37) (2.63) (2.52)
Observations 331 331 331 331
Est. Method FE FE FE FE
t statistics in parentheses
Constant term and dummies for year and country included,
but not reported.
The sample size is now 331 observations due to
missing observations on INWSTOCK
.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 12: REABS and different openness-measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
REABS REABS REABS REABS
TRADE/GDP 0.01 0.05
(0.21) (1.01)
INWSTOCK 0.11 0.12
(0.93) (1.08)
KOF-INDEX -0.02 0.03
(-0.18) (0.34)
POP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.75) (0.65) (0.88) (0.73)
PLT15 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (-0.02)
PO65 -0.00∗∗ -0.00∗ -0.00∗∗ -0.00∗
(-2.32) (-2.03) (-2.14) (-1.92)
UNEMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.21) (1.48) (1.19) (1.69)
EGROWTH -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 -0.22
(-1.18) (-0.95) (-1.03) (-1.48)
LEFTCAB -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(-0.03) (-0.37) (-0.06) (-0.30)
CNCAB -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(-3.22) (-2.82) (-3.13) (-2.94)
RGDPL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.72) (0.77) (0.66) (1.03)
Observations 322 322 322 322
Est. Method FE FE FE FE
t statistics in parentheses
Constant term and dummies for year and country included,
but not reported.
The sample size is now 322 observations due to
missing observations on INWSTOCK
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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inconsistent that as the effect of each of these variables separately is negative or zero,
the overall effect should be positive or zero. Although an index summing up the effects
of openness would be useful, for the time being I concur in the statement of Garrett and
Mitchell (2001, page 156), who claim that ”the best way to analyze the effects of global-
ization is to disaggregate the phenomenon into its different components and to compare
variations not only over time but among countries as well”. As international trade has
different impacts across the selection of dependent variables, other aspects of openness
may very well behave in the same way.
In sum, my main results are quite robust - the negative effect of openness on social
expenditure clearly holds throughout this analysis, whereas the evidence for a negative
effect on redistribution is somewhat weakened - but it is important to keep in mind that
we in this analysis decrease the sample size by one third compared to table 8. Moreover,
now there are also some signs of a negative effect of FDI on generosity.
8.3.3 Endogeneity issues
So far, I have assumed that international trade and foreign direct investment are both
determined independently of welfare state generosity. The possibility that openness could
be endogenous in empirical welfare state research has been very little discussed, but there
are some examples22.
If e.g. governments use openness as a political instrument and openness and welfare
state generosity are set simultaneously, or if there is an omitted variable which determines
both welfare state generosity and openness, then the estimate of β will be biased as
E(εi,t|opennessi,t) 6= 0
To deal with this issue, one could use an appropriate instrument variable for openness
- see for instance Noguer and Siscart (2005), who attempt to control for endogeneity in
a study of income levels by instrumenting international trade by geographical variables.
To find appropriate instrumental variables for trade is very hard. One way to mitigate
potential bias is to lag the explanatory variables one period, i.e. estimate equation 12
lagging the explanatory variables in tables 10, 11 and 12. This way one avoids reverse
causality.
The results of this analysis is reported in tables 15, 16 and 17 in appendix B.
as the investor will ”aquire a lasting management interest” in the enterprise which is invested in (generally,
this means the investor holds less than 10% of the voting stock) (The World Bank, 2003).
22See Adserà and Boix (2003), who have several hypotheses for why trade might be endogenous - in
the light of the compensation hypothesis.
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The analysis confirms the effects on SOCPRO - the results in tables 10 and 15 are
for all practical reasons identical. However, the effects for FDI and for the KOF-index
on generosity are now zero, see table 16, and for redistribution, no openness-effects are
significant - the same as in table 12.
The evidence for a negative effect of openness on the institutional and redistributional
aspects of welfare state generosity is thus weak. For my volume variable however, the
results are quite clear: openness has a negative effect on social expenditure.
8.3.4 Omitting possibly endogenous control variables
As international trade is potentially endogenous in welfare state research, so might un-
employment, economic growth and level of GDP be. As a final robustness check, I omit
these control variables for from the analysis.
I estimate SOCPRO, GEN and REABS with the smaller set of control variables and
trade as explanatory variable, to see if endogeneity of the omitted controls might affect
my results - see table 14 in appendix B. As the results are almost identical to those
in table 8, there is no reason to question my main results owing to endogenous control
variables.
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9 Concluding remarks
This thesis has analyzed the effect of economic integration, or openness, on different
aspects of welfare state generosity; I have investigated three categories: social spending,
redistribution and welfare state institutions.
The reason for conducting the analysis in this way was to address both the large de-
bate on whether openness causes governments compensate citizens for risk or instead cut
back on welfare benefits, and the debate on how welfare state generosity should be mea-
sured empirically. This approach enabled us to investigate how openness affects different
conceptualizations of welfare states and to compare the results across the categories.
Through a critical evaluation of data and variables available, it became clear that
the two welfare spending variables from OECD, which have been widely employed in
similar analyses, have several shortcomings: the variable for gross social spending is too
broadly defined and has too short a time span for my purpose, and the alternative, the
variable for social security benefits, is unreliable. To correct for this, the variable for
”public expenditure on social protection” (SOCPRO) from Sanz and Velázquez (2007)
and Gemmell et al. (2008) was utilized as my measure of social spending.
As the measure of public expenditure on social protection follows specific social trans-
fers over time, I believe that this variable captures welfare state generosity. The index
of welfare generosity does not change much over time, and might therefore not be suit-
able for this type of analysis, which utilizes precisely changes in the observed countries
over time. The redistribution variable, which measures changes in the Gini-index by the
pre-post approach, is precisely the opposite - it is very volatile and does not follow a
particular trend. However, as the simulated numbers behind this variable are new and
the reliability of the data is not yet clarified, it might not be an accurate description of
real changes in redistribution. Moreover, the coefficient of the pre-post variable might be
biased.
The analysis clearly rejects the null hypothesis of no country - and year specific
effects, so I perform the analysis by a fixed effects regression on my unbalanced data
set for 18 OECD-countries in the time period 1970-2000. From the analysis it is clear
that openness, measured by international trade in percentage of GDP, decreases social
expenditure and fiscal redistribution. My results thus provide substance for the efficiency
hypothesis. The theoretical background for the negative effect goes through the link
of international tax competition, and my results are consistent with studies showing
that national governments set their tax rates as a function of tax rates in neighboring
countries. When governments have to compete for mobile tax bases as economic openness
increases, this gives incentives to alter rates, and maintaining the initial level of welfare
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state generosity becomes harder.
From the sensitivity analysis, the results for my volume variable are quite robust, and
there are also some weak results that openness, in terms of foreign direct investment,
decreases social entitlements, measured by an index of welfare generosity. However, at
the same time, the evidence for a negative effect on redistribution is weakened.
All in all, the negative effect of increased openness is clear for social expenditure,
whereas for the other two categories the evidence is not so evident. The effects of both
openness and control variables are different across the three categories. If the results had
been highly correlated, what concept one employed for welfare state generosity would
not be a crucial issue in empirical analysis, but instead what aspect of welfare generosity
clearly affects the outcome.
In conclusion, in the light of the data available and the shortcomings of different
welfare variables, it will be better to conceptualize welfare state generosity by a variable
like SOCPRO.
Although my analysis shows that the negative effect on this variable holds through
several robustness checks, future research on this topic should look further into potential
endogeneity problems with using welfare spending and different measures of openness in
empirical analysis.
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Appendices
A Details of the KOF-index
This index includes both actual flows (trade, FDI, portfolio investments) as well as nor-
mative restrictions (capital account restrictions, trade barriers). The index taxes a value
between 0 and 100. Each variable is transformed to an index with a 0-10 scale, where
higher value means higher openness. Detailed information on the variables used and the
weighting is found in table 13 (Dreher, 2006a).
The weighting is done by principal components analysis, which is a way to identify
patterns, or variance, in the data by a vector space transform. The goal of this transform
is to create a basis which filters out the noise in the dataset and reveals the hidden
structure (Shlens, 2005). Here, the year 2000 is chosen as the base year. For this year,
the variance of the variables used is partitioned, and the weights each component of the
index should have are determined in a way that maximizes the variance of the resulting
principal component (Dreher, 2006a).
Table 13: KOF-index of economic globalization
Type of variable Variable Weight
Actual Flows: 50%
Trade (percent of GDP) 18%
FDI flows (percent of GDP) 21%
FDI stock (percent of GDP) 22%
Portfolio Investment (percent of GDP) 19%
Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (percent of GDP) 20%
Restrictions: 50%
Hidden Import Barriers 24%
Mean Tariff Rate 28%
Taxes on International Trade (percent of current revenue) 27%
Capital Account Restrictions 20%
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B Regressions from sensitivity analyses
Table 14: Omitting possibly endogenous control variables
(1) (2) (3)
SOCPRO GEN REABS
TRADE/GDP -0.08∗∗∗ 0.02 -0.11∗∗
(-3.94) (0.41) (-2.35)
POP -0.00 -0.00∗∗ 0.00
(-1.21) (-2.86) (1.55)
PLT15 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(1.16) (1.71) (-0.54)
PO65 0.00 0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗
(0.61) (2.91) (-2.35)
LEFTCAB -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(-0.41) (0.74) (-0.28)
CNCAB 0.00 0.01 -0.01
(0.07) (1.38) (-1.51)
Observations 480 538 487
Est. Method FE FE FE
t statistics in parentheses
Constant term and dummies for year and country included,
but not reported.
See notes to table 7.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 15: SOCPRO - lagged explanatory variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SOCPRO SOCPRO SOCPRO SOCPRO
L1TRADEGDP -0.06 -0.13∗∗∗
(-1.57) (-3.62)
L1INWSTOCK -0.11∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗
(-3.20) (-4.29)
L1KOFINDEX 0.10∗ 0.09∗
(1.83) (1.88)
POP -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00∗
(-1.47) (-1.25) (-1.65) (-1.99)
PLT15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00∗
(1.42) (1.02) (1.62) (1.86)
PO65 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00
(1.79) (1.12) (2.11) (1.73)
UNEMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.86) (1.47) (1.17) (0.70)
EGROWTH -0.08 -0.16∗∗ -0.16∗∗ -0.05
(-1.44) (-2.92) (-2.28) (-0.90)
LEFTCAB -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.17) (0.02) (0.07) (0.57)
CNCAB -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(-0.30) (-0.10) (-0.34) (0.08)
RGDPL -0.00∗∗ -0.00∗∗ -0.00∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗
(-2.78) (-2.44) (-2.49) (-3.45)
Observations 255 255 255 255
Est. Method FE FE FE FE
t statistics in parentheses
The sample size is now 269 due to
missing observations on INWSTOCK.
See notes to table 10
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 16: Generosity - lagged explanatory variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GEN GEN GEN GEN
L1TRADEGDP 0.00 -0.03
(0.04) (-0.70)
L1INWSTOCK -0.07 -0.07
(-1.70) (-1.47)
L1KOFINDEX 0.09 0.07
(1.31) (1.17)
POP -0.00 -0.00 -0.00∗ -0.00∗
(-1.73) (-1.68) (-1.83) (-1.90)
PLT15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.30) (1.32) (1.48) (1.60)
PO65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.45) (1.25) (1.56) (1.45)
UNEMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.52) (1.57) (1.74) (1.21)
EGROWTH -0.18∗∗ -0.18∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗
(-2.13) (-2.82) (-3.31) (-2.24)
LEFTCAB 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.78) (1.32) (1.10) (1.58)
CNCAB 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗
(3.09) (3.05) (2.98) (2.84)
RGDPL 0.00∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗
(2.12) (2.34) (2.39) (2.32)
Observations 316 316 316 316
Est. Method FE FE FE FE
t statistics in parentheses
The sample size is now 331 due to
missing observations on INWSTOCK.
See notes to table 10
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 17: Fiscal redistribution - lagged explanatory variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
REABS REABS REABS REABS
L1TRADEGDP -0.04 0.01
(-0.47) (0.22)
L1INWSTOCK 0.12 0.13
(0.91) (0.99)
L1KOFINDEX 0.01 0.05
(0.10) (0.57)
POP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.42) (0.49) (0.74) (0.42)
PLT15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.37) (0.32) (0.35) (0.35)
PO65 -0.00∗∗ -0.00∗ -0.00∗∗ -0.00
(-2.21) (-1.93) (-2.18) (-1.74)
UNEMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.89) (1.34) (1.00) (1.45)
EGROWTH -0.08 -0.10 -0.12 -0.13
(-0.73) (-0.68) (-0.80) (-1.09)
LEFTCAB -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(-0.07) (-0.49) (-0.04) (-0.44)
CNCAB -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(-4.14) (-2.96) (-3.96) (-3.35)
RGDPL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.57) (0.71) (0.59) (0.79)
Observations 309 309 309 309
Est. Method FE FE FE FE
t statistics in parentheses
The sample size is now 322 due to
missing observations on INWSTOCK.
See notes to table 10
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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